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ABSTRACT: There are obvious benefits to ranking academic departments based on objective measures of faculty research output. However, there are considerable difficulties
associated with producing reliable and accurate rankings. In this short comment, we offer
an evaluation of Heald and Sichelman's recent foray into the project of ranking law
schools. Heald and Sichelman are to be commended for the transparency and rigor of
their rankings effort. At the same time, it is important to note that their rankings involve
a series of contestable discretionary choices and could give rise to potential counterproductive gaming by law schools seeking to improve their place in the rankings. In particular, Heald and Sichelman's system places a thumb on the scale on behalf of more senior
faculty who publish in traditional law reviews and write in popular substantive areas like
constitutional law. This raises the concern that rankings of this type could discourage law
schools from hiring faculty that are young, produce interdisciplinary scholarship, and
write in otherwise underrepresented fields. Nonetheless, Heald and Sichelman have taken
an important step forward, and other scholars should look to build profitably upon their
work.
CITATION: Adam Chilton & Jonathan Masur, What Should Law School Rankings
Measure and How Should We Measure It: A Comment on Heald and Sichelman’s
Rankings, 60 JURIMETRICS J. __–__ (2019).

There are obvious benefits to ranking academic departments based on objective measures of faculty research output. However, there are considerable
difficulties associated with producing reliable and accurate rankings. Paul Heald
and Ted Sichelman deserve substantial credit for undertaking a project to improve upon existing efforts to rank the academic impact of law school faculties,
particularly in light of the fact that U.S. News & World Report now claims that
it will incorporate some type of citation ranking into its overall assessment of
law schools.1 Moreover, Heald and Sichelman’s work is careful and thorough,
and they are admirably honest about its limitations and shortcomings. They also
deserve considerable credit for their commitment to transparency and replicability.
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At the same time, there are many issues raised by their rankings that deserve
further discussion. The reason is simple: if rankings of academic impact based
on citations are incorporated into U.S. News’s overall rankings of law schools,
schools may try to maximize their ranking, even at the cost of other academic
or social values. Decisions regarding how to construct rankings will thus directly impact the kinds of scholarship, and scholars, that are produced and rewarded. These decisions should thus be carefully debated by the legal academy
and only made after thoughtful consideration about exactly what the rankings
should measure and how best to do it. To contribute to that necessary debate, in
this short comment, we have two goals: to describe and decompose some of
those necessary decisions about what to measure, and to highlight some problems that may result from using HeinOnline to measure faculty impact. 2

I. DECIDING WHAT TO MEASURE
It is impossible to develop law school rankings without making normative
judgements about what should be measured. To their credit, Heald and Sichelman do not ignore this reality. Instead, they argue that rankings can be used for
several purposes: (1) provide a general indication of faculty reputation; (2) aid
entry-level and lateral job candidates who are making decisions about particular
law schools; and (3) provide advice to students “who care about the scholarly
reputation and quality of their professors.” 3 Identifying these purposes raises
many questions about what rankings should measure, but it does not provide
clear answers to them. Their current rankings make at least four contestable
judgements that should potentially be reexamined.
First, in addition to including citations from HeinOnline, the Heald and
Sichelman rankings are also based on downloads from SSRN. Although there
are reasons to be concerned about the way HeinOnline measures citations
(which we discuss below), the basic case for using citations to assess academic
impact is straightforward: they are a revealed preference measure of the impact
2. We should note at the outset that our own scholarship is not entirely immune from our
criticisms. See, e.g., Adam Chilton, Jonathan Masur, & Kyle Rozema, Rethinking Law School
Tenure Standards (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Chilton et al., Tenure Standards] (unnumbered
working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3200005; Adam Chilton,
Jonathan Masur, & Kyle Rozema, Affirmative Action in Law Reviews (Dec. 30, 2018) (unnumbered
working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295334; Adam Chilton,
Jonathan Masur, & Kyle Rozema, Political Discrimination in the Law Review Selection Process
(Jan. 31, 2019) (unnumbered working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3119903. We would note two things in our defense against the charge of hypocrisy we have just
leveled at ourselves. First, the goal of our scholarship has been to test hypotheses, and not to produce
rankings. As a result, many of the limitations in our own work are a source of measurement error
that should be acknowledged, but we do not make relevant claims about specific observations (e.g.,
School A compared to School B) because we recognize the data may be too noisy for such a specific
comparison. However, highlighting these specific comparisons is the exact purpose of producing
rankings. Second, we hope the debate generated by Heald and Sichelman’s important project will
improve many scholars’ future work—including our own.
3. Heald & Sichelman, supra note 1 (manuscript at 37). We’re not sure of the value of the first
of these purposes independent of the second and third, except to provide a sense of which law
schools are “winning,” so we will leave that one aside and focus on the second and third purposes.
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of one piece of scholarship on other scholarship. The case for using SSRN
downloads as a proxy for academic impact, however, is less straightforward.
The case that Heald and Sichelman make for using SSRN downloads is that they
provide a useful corollary to citations as a measure of academic impact, because
[citation databases] catch formal scholarly references to an article, but they
provide no indication of how often the article has been read (rather than cited)
not only by legal academics but also by practitioners and others outside the
legal academy. By incorporating SSRN data, we provide a better sense of the
“splash” an article has made. We argue that an article that has been downloaded
1000 times is likely to have enhanced its author’s reputation more than an article that has been cited 10 times.4

Although we would not disagree that 1000 downloads may do more to enhance
reputation than 10 citations, it is not clear that academic impact rankings should
be trying to measure reputation in this way. SSRN downloads occur before the
paper is read (and thus before the quality, novelty, or relevance of the argument
is assessed), and downloads are often driven by either the visibility of the author
or links from the popular press. Thus, downloads may tell us little about the
underlying quality of an article or its impact on academic debates. Or, to put it
another way, acquiring 1000 Twitter followers may do more to enhance a law
professor’s reputation than writing an article that is cited 10 times, but most
would likely agree that counting law professors’ Twitter followers would be a
bad way to measure their quality. Similarly, it certainly enhances a law professor’s reputation when she publishes an op-ed, is cited by courts, or testifies before congress. Like downloads, these activities may be important, but they are
different than academic impact or quality as it has traditionally been measured.
Moreover, given the correlation between Heald and Sichelman’s SSRN-only
and Hein-only rankings (0.84),5 it is not clear the inclusion of SSRN is necessary.
Second, the Heald and Sichelman rankings do not make adjustments for
fields, age, or other demographic factors. Although citations have not been studied as extensively in law as they have in other fields, there is evidence that citations vary by factors like age, field, gender, and race. As a result, the choice to
not adjust for these features is an implicit decision about what kinds of faculty
composition should be rewarded. For instance, we have found in our own work
that tax scholars are cited less than constitutional law scholars. 6 If rankings are
not adjusted for field, law schools might decide to hire fewer tax scholars and
more constitutional law scholars, because constitutional law scholars generally
earn more citations. This trend will be self-reinforcing: as the number of constitutional law professors increases, the number of constitutional law papers will
increase, thereby increasing the number of citations of work by other constitutional law professors. Tax citations will decrease via the opposite mechanisms.
This will skew law schools’ incentives even further.
4. Id. (manuscript at 4–5).
5. Id. (manuscript at 5).
6. Chilton et al., Tenure Standards, supra note 2, at 34.
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In addition, rankings that rely on the median or mean of cumulative lifetime
citations will predictably quite heavily reward schools with older faculties. The
question of whether it makes sense to favor older faculties in this manner depends greatly upon the purposes the rankings are meant to serve. Of course,
some students and faculty candidates might be seeking the faculties with the
greatest lifetime accomplishments. If this is the case, then cumulative lifetime
citations is the most sensible measure. But other students and faculty candidates
might be more interested in the faculties currently producing the best work. If
this is the case, citation counts from the past one to five years would be a superior measure.
However, even rankings that look only at citations within the past one to
five years will favor older faculties, possibly by significant margins. The reason
is that those faculties will have a larger accumulated body of work that might
be cited. A faculty member who has been teaching for 20 years and has published 40 articles is likely to garner more citations within the next twelve months
than a faculty member who has been teaching for 5 years and has published 10
articles, all else being equal. Heald and Sichelman’s data supports this intuition.7
There are several approaches that could be used to counteract the thumb on
the scale favoring older faculties and provide a more accurate picture of which
law schools are currently the most productive. One would be effectively to control for seniority by grouping scholars into age-related cohorts and evaluating
citations within cohorts. That is, a ranking system could compare citations to
scholars who have been teaching zero to five years, six to ten years, eleven to
fifteen years, and so forth. Cohorts could then be compared across schools to
evaluate how the most junior scholars at School X performed compared to the
most junior scholars at School Y, how mid-career scholars at the two schools
performed, and so on.8 Another approach would be to count citations within the
past X years only to articles published within the past X years. This would provide an indication of the quality of work being done by a faculty—including
both senior and junior scholars—at the current moment, rather than a ranking
that largely reflects work done years or decades earlier.9
Third, the Heald and Sichelman rankings attribute citations entirely to
scholars and not to the place where the scholarship was produced. For example,
imagine a highly influential faculty member, Professor Smith, who has taught
at School B since 2015. Before 2015, she taught at School A. Professor Smith
was already a highly influential scholar with many citations when she moved
7. See Heald & Sichelman, supra note 1 (manuscript at 15). Their finding that twelve-month
SSRN download numbers do not favor older faculties is unsurprising. There is much less reason to
download an article on SSRN once that article has been published because it is available through
other means. Accordingly, older articles will generally reap many fewer downloads than newer articles, and a senior scholar’s larger corpus of existing scholarship will not provide as much of an
advantage.
8. For example, we used this kind of cohort-based grouping in our study on tenure standards
to ensure that professors were being compared to their contemporaries. See Chilton et al., Tenure
Standards, supra note 2, at 3–5.
9. We also used a variant of this methodology in our tenure study, where we examined pretenure citations to pre-tenure articles and post-tenure citations to post-tenure articles. Id.
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from School A to School B in 2015, and the work she did at School A—including a particularly well-cited 2011 article, A Theory of Law—is still cited quite
regularly. The Heald and Sichelman rankings would attribute all of Professor
Smith’s citations to School B, because that is where she teaches now. In particular, if A Theory of Law was cited 100 times in 2013 (while Professor Smith
was teaching at School A), Professor Smith would “carry” those citations with
her when she moved to School B, even though she earned them while she was
teaching at School A based on work done at School A.
Whether this decision is reasonable depends on what the rankings are trying
to measure. For instance, faculty and students might be seeking very different
things when they choose a law school—and, of course, different faculty and
different students might be seeking different things from one another as well.
Some faculty or students might be seeking schools with the most prestigious and
well-regarded senior faculty, perhaps on the theory that they have the greatest
body of accumulated knowledge. Other faculty or students might instead be
looking for the faculty that is currently most active in scholarship and producing
the most (and best) new work, perhaps on the theory that such an environment
will be most conducive to research and learning. The design of the rankings will
influence which of these priorities is better captured. In the example above, it is
the students and faculty of School B who now have the privilege of interacting
with Professor Smith, and so perhaps all of her influence and accumulated
knowledge—as proxied for by those citations—should be attributed to School
B. On the other hand, School A obviously did something right before 2015 when
it hired Professor Smith and created the conditions that allowed her to write such
an important piece of scholarship. A new faculty member seeking a generative
environment might prefer a system of rankings that attributed Professor Smith’s
work at School A to School A, thus reflecting the productivity of scholars who
are members of that faculty.
Additionally, attributing citations to the place they were “earned” (in whole
or in part) might mitigate perverse hiring and retention incentives. Specifically,
if citations are attributed entirely to the scholar, schools could improve their
ranking by hiring a senior lateral candidate who is no longer research active
instead of hiring a more junior lateral candidate who is more engaged in scholarship and teaching. This type of move might be good for a law school’s ranking
but bad for the students and other faculty at the law school. Relatedly, schools
will have good reason to encourage senior faculty members to not retire—even
if they are no longer effective teachers, mentors, or scholars—simply to retain
their citations for U.S. News rankings. Both behaviors would limit the opportunities for new scholars to break into the legal academy and, in turn, hamper the
production and dissemination of knowledge. It would also further entrench the
status quo distribution of academic jobs along existing race and gender lines.
Fourth, there is the further question, which Heald and Sichelman explore,
regarding whether it makes more sense to use the mean or median citations of a
faculty as a measure of that faculty’s quality. The use of mean citations will
favor faculties with right-tail outliers—true superstars—even if the remainder
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of the faculty is weaker. The use of median citations will favor faculties of more
consistent overall quality.
Heald and Sichelman have taken what largely amounts to a middle route
through these questions. As their measure of citations, they use 2 × mean +
median. They also give equal weight to total lifetime citations and citations
within the past twelve months. However, both of those measures favor more
senior faculties. This is of course just a first effort, and a single paper, and thus
Heald and Sichelman should not be criticized for their attempts to balance these
competing considerations. To the contrary, they deserve praise for their commitment to making the raw data available so future researchers can try alternative weighting schemes.
Nonetheless, it might be that this middle-ground approach, in attempting to
serve all possible purposes, does not serve any of them especially well. It might
be more useful to have two (or more) separate rankings, each tailored to various
purposes. We could imagine a “lifetime” ranking that looked at mean lifetime
citations; a “current productivity” ranking that looked only at contemporary citations to contemporary articles; and possibly a balanced ranking that controlled
for seniority by grouping faculty into age cohorts. Again, the choice between these
options depends very much upon what purpose the rankings are meant to serve.

II. ACCURATE MEASUREMENT
Whatever rankings are trying to measure, it matters that they measure it
accurately. This is because we should anticipate that schools will likely try to
game rankings, just as schools have tried to game all other aspects of U.S. News
rankings. It would be especially pernicious if rankings created incentives for law
schools to exploit measurement error. Thus, it is important to try to insulate the
rankings from being gamed as much as possible, or at minimum to try and ensure that “gaming” the rankings will result in schools maximizing the types of
things our profession deems worth maximizing.
Here, the most important limitation of HeinOnline—one that Heald and
Sichelman discuss—is that it includes only citations to articles within the Hein
database by articles within the Hein database. That means that these rankings
will dramatically underestimate the influence of scholars who regularly publish
or are cited in other types of publications, such as books or nonlegal journals.
Both of these limitations—related to the venue of publication, and the source of
the citation—will tend to disadvantage scholars who work at the intersection of
law and cognate disciplines, particularly history and philosophy (where much
of the scholarly output occurs through books), but also economics, political science, psychology, sociology, and others.
Heald and Sichelman admirably acknowledge the limitation related to
scholarly work that is published in books and (even more admirably) resolve to
correct it in future versions of their study. However, they are somewhat dismissive of the value of citations to legal work in nonlegal publications.10 We are
10. Heald & Sichelman, supra note 1 (manuscript at 10) (“Even so, it is not clear to us that
out-of-field citations—for instance, in the anthropology or psychology literature—have the same
relevance for measuring law school impact as in-field citations.”).
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not sure why a citation to a law professor’s work in a philosophy or history
journal should count less than a citation to the same individual’s work in a law
journal. The point of our profession is to create and disseminate knowledge, and
knowledge in a cognate discipline seems no less valuable than knowledge in law
itself. This is especially true in an era in which more and more law faculty have
training in related fields and do work that spans both fields. To take just one
somewhat extreme example: Richard Thaler’s work on “nudging,” which he coauthored with Cass Sunstein, was cited in the announcement of his Nobel Prize
in Economics.11 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences obviously did not
consider Thaler’s work to be less valuable merely because a significant portion
of its impact has been felt in law, rather than economics. It would be equally
bizarre to discount the impact of Cass Sunstein’s contributions to that same body
of scholarship because some of that impact has been felt in economics, rather
than law.
Any source of measurement error will likely replicate itself in the real
world. If we produce and rely upon rankings that do not accurately measure the
impact of historians, this will have the recursive effect of (incorrectly) reducing
the number of legal historians hired by law faculties. It is thus important to find
solutions to these problems. The most natural solution would be to require every
school to produce Google Scholar pages for every scholar, as Brian Galle has
suggested.12 But other solutions, such as the full-text analysis Heald and Sichelman mention, should be explored as well.

We believe that the questions we have raised here are fundamental to any
attempt to rank law faculties. But at the same time, we do not believe that there
are objectively right answers to most of these questions. As we have said, the
right answer might depend upon who is using the rankings, and for what purpose. As things stand, the important normative judgments are being made unilaterally by the rankers themselves—Sisk, Heald and Sichelman, and (soon)
U.S. News. This is not necessarily undesirable, but it might be preferable if they
were made through a sort of deliberative process by our discipline as a whole.
It would be even better if they could be made behind the veil of ignorance, with
law professors deciding on which measures are most sensible without knowing
how they (or their schools) would fare under those measures. That is likely impossible, but one can always dream. In the meantime, Heald and Sichelman are
to be commended for an important and significant step in the right direction.

11. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Prize in Economic Sciences 2017 (Oct.
9, 2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/press-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/G48Y-2799].
12. Brian Galle, How I’d Fix the Sisk-Leiter Citation Studies, MEDIUM (May 25, 2016), https://
medium.com/whatever-source-derived/how-id-fix-the-sisk-leiter-citation-studies-4489f87ed387#.
n6oeh4jf6 [https://perma.cc/K4CR-NXJ6].
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